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‘When you were young you were called
Ramabhadra. As you grew older and looked
beautiful, the people named you Ramachandra;
when you commenced to speak, they called you
Vedha-Brahma; Raghunatha on your ascension to
the throne, and Janaki-pati when you were
married to Janaki. I bow to you, O king of the gods,
Mahatma, and the life of Janaki’
Ayodhya Mahatmya 1875: 142–43
‘The mystical analysis of the word Ayodhya has its
roots in the doctrine of the eternity of sound,
combining in itself the iconography of the
terrestrial city and the sound of divine reality…
The linguistic etymology that follows this mystical
one explains the word “a-yodhya” as meaning
unconquerable’
Bakker, Vol. II 1986: 23
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1 The town of Ayodhya, situated in the district of Faizabad in the state of Uttar Pradesh in
north India, is a place of pilgrimage for devotees of the Hindu god Rama. Ayodhya, they
hold, is his janmasthan (birthplace) that is marked by a temple.1 Until December 1992 the
birthplace was also the site of a mosque, known since the 1940s as the Babri Masjid.2 From
at least the middle of the 19th century Ayodhya has witnessed bitter violence between
Hindus and Muslims regarding the exact status of this spot. Hindu believers argue that
the Babri Masjid, constructed in 1528 by a general in the army of the Mughal emperor
Babur, took the place of the razed temple of the janmasthan. In law we find a long history
of litigation—since 1885 civil courts at various levels of the judicial hierarchy (Sessions
Courts, District Courts, High Courts and the Supreme Court of India) have debated the
status of the temple-mosque complex. This litigation is ongoing and there is nothing to
suggest a resolution.3 The judicial record names this complex as the Ayodhya dispute.
Beginning in the 1980s, a number of Hindu organizations, collectively called the Sangh
Parivar, advocated the destruction of the mosque and its replacement by a grand temple
dedicated  to  Rama.  Following  prolonged  political  and  religious  mobilization,  Hindus
congregated  at  its  site  demolished  the  mosque  on  6  December  1992.  The  Liberhan
Commission of Enquiry estimates that about 150,000 people had gathered around the
temple-mosque complex on that day and that 150 ‘karsevaks’ (religious workers) actually
participated in its destruction.4
2  Given that the Ayodhya dispute is extensively covered in civil and criminal law, how
might we construct claims and counter claims—to property, modes of worship, rules of
evidence and the demands of secularism?5 In this paper I follow a slightly different line of
enquiry by asking myself how claims to the past are reckoned and admitted in courts of
law. These declarations of rights, almost without fail, denote a complex that exceeds what
is specifically being argued. From the point of view of Hindu worshippers, these claims to
the past are detailed in the proper noun, which designates an ensemble of virtues tied to
specific architectural sites in Ayodhya. In this way we may draw the relation between the
Rama deity and the city of Ayodhya. The resonance of these two names in law provides
the most commodious frame within which the dispute may be understood.  From the
point of view of Muslim claims after 1992, the Babri Mosque has lost its character as a
mosque,  but  leaves  traces  of  its  disappearance in law.  What  has  disappeared can be
identified and named, but its ‘en-tonguing’ in law is a betrayal of being, since the name
Babri Mosque does not ensure the presence of its materiality, much less Muslim forms of
worship.6
3 I  rely  on  two types  of  texts  to  make my case. Separated  in  time by  130  years,  the
importance of these records is that they index a community of names that continue to
carry ethical weight in the present. The two texts—the Ayodhya Mahatmya (Testament to
Ayodhya; henceforth AM) of 1875 and the Allahabad High Court Judgment of 2010 (2010
ADJ  I,  II,  III, [Special  F.B.])  provide  a  glimpse  into  possible  worlds,  marked  by  the
appearance and power of Hindu deities and the disappearance of the Babri Mosque.7 In
reading these two texts together I show how the High Court decision is aligned to the
Ayodhya Mahatmya. The Mahatmya passes on a textual object to the High Court—the many
names of Rama. In this passing there is more than a simple confirmation of the High
Court decision. This transit, marked by a temporal continuity, rests on the repertoire of
the names of Rama tied to the spaces of the town. The result is a conventional orienting
framework that almost stages the High Court decision with the AM acting as a thesaurus
for the name. In this text the names of Rama occur as a constellation of ritual practices,
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while in the High Court, these practices unfold or, are more appropriately, organized into
a stretch of legal discourse, hived off from empirical evidence. In effect, such practices
are ‘entextualized’ in the way that Barber (2007: 107–109) uses the term.
4 The Allahabad High Court verdict of 2010 attempted to provide a solution to the 125-year-
old Ayodhya dispute by a threefold division of the property of the complex. The majority
decision gave the litigants—two groups of Hindus and one of Muslims, an equal share. The
AM of 1875 finds explicit  mention in the judgments.  A year later the Supreme Court
overturned this verdict. As it stands now, the four basic suits that make up the dispute in
civil  jurisdiction are  being heard and argued in  the  Allahabad High Court  sitting  at
Lucknow. In its destruction, the mosque leaves traces of its fading in law—it is almost as if
the name, Babri Mosque, is a necessary condition for inscribing disappearance. Although
after 1992 the Babri Mosque is not available as an architectural structure, its circulation
in the High Court judgment is presupposed as the background of the judicial decision.
This decision, in turn, rests on what remains in place of the mosque. In part what remains
are ruins, but also in part, a re-imagination of Rama and the city. I begin with this re-
imagination.
5 The pair, Rama-Ayodhya has magical powers. The union of these two terms reveals the
link of architectural place to mythic time, a bond that is ostensibly a non-negotiable
example of our politico-religious present. Furthermore, the pair is shrouded in an aura
signalling that this is the place where the Rama temple should have been, or will be,
constructed. The aura, given the troubling presence of the absent mosque, indicates the
inability to express fully the meaning of the pair according to the rules of a predictable
truth game. This is because the couple marks the place where historical knowledge sees
its competence impugned. In its place Rama-Ayodhya signposts a view of time that is both
continuous and broken. In one type of text, Rama and Ayodhya are employed as if their
designation were stable and all the units—symbols, icons and forms of prayer—depending
on their relationship were already collected into an integrated and timeless complex. But
secondly, the pair’s open future emerges from the ongoing movement of the past as it
comes to inhabit contemporary legal accounts. This emergence is unstable: Rama and
Ayodhya signal an open, chaotic union where forms of prayer and revealed symbols jostle
for space in the legitimacy of the nation-state. This paper unpacks this temporality by
centring on the discursive content of the two names—Rama and Ayodhya. In so doing my
intention is to show how Ayodhya is materialized through the many names of Rama, and
how the deity Rama, in turn, is invigorated in the geography of this temple town.
6 For the above reasons, rather than consider Rama and Ayodhya as ‘rigid designators,’ I
will discuss the relationship between them in terms of a family resemblance.8 By this I
mean that the significance of both Rama and Ayodhya is maintained by dense networks of
water bodies and buildings; together the two names alert us to a cluster of virtues, which
endure and subsist, as much as they develop in response to change; together, the two are
a past, but a past that inhabits the present. As a complex of enduring virtues the pair fixes
space to time; as a complex of mobile centres, the pair functions like a parasite, leaching
off secular law and seeming to provide its raison d’être. That is to say, the only way in
which  the  Allahabad  High  Court  decision  admits  the  validity  of  Hindu  claims  is  by
acknowledging the tractability of mythic time in its proceedings. In this way, Rama and
Ayodhya provide a counter to historic time and rules of evidence based on empirical
detail, thereby exposing secular law’s insufficiency.
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7 At the heart of this paper is an attempt to understand how these two names intersect.
Rather than showing their  referential  and predicative qualities,  I  will  argue that  the
relationship between these names allows us to think of the present as ceaseless. But this
perpetual present is also marked and disrupted by the absent Babri mosque. The value of
this mark is that, at least in the legal record, it haunts the link of Rama to Ayodhya. It
could be argued that this haunting becomes possible since the name Rama is empty—it
occurs in fiction and has no semantic function other than its place in a story. I do not
consider the name Rama to be empty. Nor do I ask whether Rama really existed since that
question is unintelligible. In terms of the texts that I am considering, the story of Rama in
Ayodhya  is  not  merely  a  commemoration  but  a  kind  of  unlimited  chart,  where  all
duration, corporeal and ethereal, can be located in relation to the fixed and determinate
guidelines of the Hindu calendar. As I see it the semantic function of Rama, in the context
of Ayodhya, is to designate others, specifically, the town and to ground this designation
in the calendar. In so doing, the question that is asked by both the Ayodhya Mahatmya and
law is: what makes life possible? As answer, one may say that the virtues by which life is
made liveable are drawn out in the Mahatmya and it is these virtues that are exalted in
law as action in the present. But this answer assumes an unbroken temporal continuity
between the Mahatmya of 1875 and the High Court judgment of 2010. I suggest that this
stability is disrupted by a third name that cannot be invoked in this complex of virtues.
This third name is of course the Babri Masjid.
8 This paper is divided into two parts. In the first, taking the Ayodhya Mahatmya, I will detail
the ways in which Rama and Ayodhya are predicates of named terrestrial spaces and
water bodies. Together, the force of these predicates is activated by religious pilgrimages
and oblations organized around the Hindu festival calendar. In this way the material city
and the deity are tied to eternal, ceaseless time. In the second part I will argue that this
temporality is negotiated and contested in secular law, specifically in pronouncements
and  testimony  that  consider  how  the  Rama  deity  establishes  dominion  over  the
janmasthan (the place where Rama was born) and the janmabhumi (the town of Ayodhya).
But  a  third  name—the  absent  Babri  Mosque—in  haunting  judicial  accounts  of  this
dominion, functions like a spectre, inflecting judicial pronouncements with the force of
historical facticity.
9 Within the history and mythology of  Ayodhya,  the name may,  in the sense outlined
above,  point  us  to an eternal  present  as  well  as  a  revenant.  Derrida (1994)  uses  the
metaphor of haunting to witness unsettled and troubling histories—a plea for justice on
behalf  of  those  who are  not  there.  Half  suppressed  memories  appear  and disappear
among us  in  the  manner  of  a  revenant.  Haunting for  Derrida  is  a  crossing between
presence  and absence—what  he  calls  the  ‘spectrality  effect’  (1994: 48),  an  effect  that
houses ghosts. The Babri mosque, too, may be understood as a revenant, but in a way that
is more literal and agentive than Derrida’s revenant. The mosque here is not merely a
rhetorical figure that undoes the binary between presence and absence. Its demolition
puts  into  crisis,  or  at  any  rate  introduces,  instability  in  law.  In  law,  the  mosque  is
constituted and reconstituted in Ayodhya, but as a figure that is central in its absence
from its geography. Debates around this absence force secular bureaucrats and judges to
engage with popular (and populist) Hindu religiosity, pointing, in the process to the name
Babri Masjid as an unquiet absence. The ghostly claims of this name carry ethical weight
in the resolution of the Ayodhya dispute, indicating a sense of rights and obligations,
sometimes contested, at other times glossed over between those who argue for the Rama
Naming the Deity, Naming the City: Rama and Ayodhya
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 12 | 2015
4
temple and those who plead for the presence of the demolished mosque.  Sometimes,
quite literally, we hear of laments for a lost burial ground, as if the memory of the dead
has also been killed. But if  the plight of the mosque evokes a vision of ethical order




10 The frame story of  this  paraphrase is  presented as a  conversation between Siva and
Parvati. Siva proclaims the Ayodhya Mahatmya and Parvati acts as an interlocutor, wanting
to know the significance of particular places in the city.9 The text begins by providing a
broad outline of Ayodhya, detailing its mythic origins and establishing its dimensions.10
The 1875 AM says that  it  was built  on Rama’s  sudarshanchakra (chariot),  while  other
recensions say that Visvakarma built the city. In the text Ayodhya resembles the eternal
city of the gods but what is specific is that the celestial city is linked to forts, palaces, city
halls and lakes that are found in the actual town. The AM provides an outline of the holy
kshetra (field) around the town. The traditional dimensions of the town are 12 yojanas (1
yojana=7 km) in length and 3 yojanas in width. The rivers Saryu and Tamasa form the
northern and southern borders of the holy places in the city. Most pilgrimages described
lie within these borders,  although this  paraphrase describes some holy places to the
south of the Tamasa as well. The average distance between the two rivers is about 20
kilometres. The city is said to have the form of a fish of which the head lies in a ford of
the Saryu river, called Gopratara and the tail at an unspecified part in the east.
11 As we know it now, Ayodhya is located on a curve of the Saryu River, which girdles the
town on three sides. The eastern and western boundaries are made up of marshes, with
the latter spreading to neighbouring Faizabad. The middle of the town known as Kot
Ramchandar or Ramkot, is dotted with innumerable temples and maths (monasteries).
The southwestern side of Ramkot, named Kubertila, is strewn with bricks and stones,
most of them from the demolished Babri mosque. The 1875 edition describes Ramkot as a
fort ringed by gates and protected by Hanuman, Sugriva and Angad, Nala and Nila, and
Sokhain.  Just  beyond  the  fort,  at  its  eastern,  western  and  northern  boundaries,
splendorous palaces are described, made up of gem encrusted stones and diamonds.
12 In the centre of Kubertila is the janmasthan, which is also the site of the demolished Babri
mosque. The most conspicuous fact relating to the pilgrimage around the janmasthan is
that a description of this principal holy place is found in all the recensions of the AM, and
yet the pilgrimage is not mentioned in any of the classical sources. ‘Such a silence is all
the  more  surprising  in  view  of  the  fact  that  archaeological  evidence  indicates  the
existence of a temple at this tirtha [pilgrimage] in the eleventh century’ (Bakker, Vol.
II: 143).  The  AM connects  the  janmasthan with  an  elaborate  description  of  Ramnavmi
(celebrated as the birthday of Rama) and provides the spatial dimensions within which
the birth occurred. This area stretches more than 500 dhanus (910 metres) westwards of
the dwelling of a sage called Lomasa, 1008 dhanus (1835 metres) eastwards of a monastery
occupied by the Ramanandi sect, called Vighnesvara and 100 dhanus (182 metres) from
Buddhist ruins called Unmatta, in an unspecified direction. In the middle of this area the
royal palace called janmasthan is situated. A monastery called Ramgulela is believed to
represent Lomasa. Janaki’s kitchen, the text says, is northwest of the janmasthan, and 40
yards to the north of janmasthan is the house of Kaikeyi (the mother of Rama’s brother,
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Bharata). 60 yards to the south of this house is the dwelling of Sumitra, mother of Rama’s
younger brothers, Satrughana and Lakshmana. Southeast of the janmasthan is the sitakup,
also  known as  the Jnanakup.  The sages,  Brihaspati,  Vasishta  and Vamadeva drink its
waters.
13 After the demolition of the mosque in Kubertila, a makeshift temple, apparently marking
the exact place of the birth of Rama, was erected in the central dome. The temple is
enclosed by railings and is guarded by a number of security personnel. No Muslims are
allowed to enter the precincts and Hindus may come only as far as the fence in front of
the entrance gate. The temple itself is located on a small altar, near which groups of
Hindus engage in continuous prayer and kirtana (hymn). During my visit to Ayodhya in
2008, a pamphlet (in English) distributed among pilgrims read:
Shri Ramjanmabhumi of Ayodhya is a very sacred place. Anticipating Hindu-Muslim
friction, the Govt. has declared it a disputed place and has taken possession over it.
Regular case is being conducted in the civil and criminal court. Since December 27,
1949 day and night Akhand Kirtan [unlimited chanting or hymn] is being performed
with a determination that it will continue so long as Ramjanmabhumi is not freed.
It  is  the sacred duty of  the entire Hindu Community to finance this  holy cause
donations (sic) and thus earn immense PUNYA [virtue and grace].
The deities can be seen through iron railings and offerings can be made through their
bars. On special occasions groups of Hindus, eleven to a unit,  are allowed to proceed
beyond the railing to worship Rama and his brothers’ deities.
14 The ghats (bathing places), the most important of which is known as Svargadvara (lit. gate
to  paradise),  are  situated along the  Saryu and lie  about  700  meters  to  the  north of
Ramkot. Gopratara, about 8 kilometres to the west of Ramkot, is the site of a second major
bathing  place.  The  1875  AM  says  that  Svargadvara,  known  also  as  Negeshvara  and
Muktidvara (gate of deliverance) is at 318 yards to the east of the thousand-streamed
Lakshmana kund (pond or lake). ‘All men, Hindus and Muslims, who die here go to the
place of Vishnu,’ and that ‘Ramachandra in the form of Bharata, Satrughan, Lakshmana
and his own, greet them there.’  Svargadvara is made up of seven ghats:  Chandrahari,
Guptahari,  Chakrahari,  Vishnuhari,  Dharmahari,  Bilvahari and Punyahari.  These baths
are  said  to  extend  over  a  distance  of  636  dhanus  (1157  metres)  to  the  east  of
Sahasradhara.  Effectively,  this includes the entire northern and north-eastern side of
Ayodhya along the riverbed as far as another bathing place known as the Janakitirtha. A
ruined mosque, dating to the time of Aurangzeb called Treta-ke-Thakur, is located 250
metres east of Chandrahari. Various temples lie along these ghats—the Saryumandir and
the  Nagesvaranathmandir  are  the  important  ones.  The  more  recent  ones  are  called
Caturbhuji  ka  Mandir  and Vidhiji  ka  Mandir,  both occupied by  the  Ramanandi  sect.
Associated with these bathing places are water bodies, mainly ponds or lakes. This AM
names more than 50 water bodies, most of which are associated with pilgrimages during
specific months of the lunar calendar.
15 For  purposes  of  brevity  we  may  establish  the  following  link  between  water  bodies,
pilgrimages and terrestrial palaces/residential buildings.
KUNDS PILGRIMAGE
Madant Dhavan (bathing area) 9th day of the dark half of Chait (March-April)
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Hanumat Every Tuesday
Sugriva (south of Hanumat) On Ramnavmi (light half of Chait)
Vibhishana (south of sugriva) On Ramnavmi (light half of Chait)
Agnikund (s.w. of Suvarnakhana) 1st day of dark half of Agrahayana (Nov-Dec)
Sitakund (middle of Asoka Vatika) 4th day of dark half of Agrahayana (Nov-Dec)
Kharjurakund (s. of Vidyakund) Every Sunday
Kausalyakund (w. of dasrathkund) Last day of Bhadra (August-September)
Sumitrakund (w. of Kausalyakund) 15th day of Bhadra (August-September)
Kaikeyikund (s. of Sumitrakund) 15th day of Bhadra (August-September)
Urvashikund (e. of Yoginikund) 3rd day of the light half of Bhadra (August-September)
Vrihaspatikund (e. of Urvashikund) 5th day of the light half of Bhadra (August-September)
Rukminikund (e. of Vrihaspatikund) 9th day of the dark half of Kartika (Oct-Nov)
Sagarakund (n.e. of Vasisthakund) Last day of Kartika (Oct-Nov)
Brahmakund (n.e. of Sagarakund) 4th day of the light half of Kartika (Oct-Nov)
Rinamochan11 (n.e. of Brahmakund) Dark half of Magha (Jan-Feb)
16 Just as water bodies are associated with specific pilgrimages, so also terrestrial places are
linked to pilgrimages. The following is a small list.
PLACES PILGRIMAGES
Svargadvara Full moon of Jyaistha (May-June)
Janmasthan Fast on Ramnavmi, bright half of Chait
Vidya pith (w. of Vidya kund) 8th day of every month
Vishnuhari shrine (w. of Dhanyaksha) 10th day of light half of Kartika (Oct-Nov)
Sitaladevi temple (n. of Mantresvara) Every Monday
Bandidevi temple (n. of Sitaladevi) Every Tuesday
House of Rishyasringa Rishi Light half of Chait (March-April)
Bhairav temple (s. of Ramkund) Dark half of Agrahayana (Nov-Dec)
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Nagari temple (near Lakshmi temple) Light half of Bhadra (Aug-Sept)
Sapneshvaradevi temple 8th/14th of every month
Ramrekha (s.e. of Manorama) Light half of Kartika (Oct-Nov)
17 The linking of water bodies to places of pilgrimage establishes correspondence between
the order of the world and that of ordinary action; more appropriately, ordinary time is
integrated as part of an eternal order. This integration is instituted in the calendar.12 I
follow Ricœur (1988: 105–09) in suggesting that the calendar marks a time of fabulation in
three different ways. First, the calendar establishes a founding event—the creation of the
city on Rama’s chariot. This creation initiates a new era, determining the axial moment in
reference  to  which  every  other  event  is  dated.  Thus  the  topography  of  Ayodhya  is
described after its institution as janmabhumi. The axial moment gives to the calendar a
form of time that is external to physical and lived time and it is this that expresses the
specificity of fabulation. It cosmologizes lived time and humanizes cosmic time and in
this way the time of the fable is re-inscribed into the time of the world.
18 Second, by referring to the founding event we see how time flows in two directions—from
the past towards the present, and from the present toward the past. This flow establishes
a closed loop and fixes the architecture of the city. This fixing, then, allows for the AM to
be used as a map so that terrestrial spaces and water bodies are oriented in terms of
cardinal directions and in relation to each other. It is this fixity that allowed for the AM
to be used as a map for the coronation of the English King. This orientation makes time
spatial.
19 Finally, we find a set of units of measurement that designate and establish the dimension
of  the city.  But these designations are more than spatial.  We find constant intervals
between  the  day,  the  week  and  the  month  marked  by  the  recurrence  of  cosmic
phenomena and miracles. In the calendar this establishes a division between the light and
dark half of the month, and the month itself is an interval between the conjunction of the
waxing and waning moon.
20 Through the calendar, the link between Rama and Ayodhya becomes a means of ordering
the city.  Each pilgrimage,  each oblation offered establishes a  present  marked by the
infinite  repetition  of  virtue.  In  the  process,  this  present  adjudicates  the  practice  of
affirming the birthplace and the land of birth of the Rama deity. The importance of these
virtues is that they invigorate and make whole the worshipper in the city and it is in this
way that  the  calendar  itself  becomes  an ethical  doctrine.  Against  the  postulate  of  a
beginning and an end, the calendar establishes a present. When the birthplace and the
land of birth enter adjudication, we find explicit references to the Rama deity and the
birthplace as jural beings. In the process, the Babri Mosque circulates in articles of law
and loses its specificity as an architectural entity. It becomes a revenant. For this reason,
if law accounts for the finitude of the Ayodhya dispute, then the placing of the Rama deity
at the heart of its decisions is not without its problems. It is to this problematic placing
that I now turn.
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The revenant in the High Court
21 In tracing the revenant  and its  disruptive presence I  consider two modes of  judicial
accounting. In the first part I read the accounts of witnesses called to testify in the High
Court, specifically as they describe the demolished Babri mosque and the family of terms
within which it is enveloped.13 The second section details how the three judges, in their
separate findings, made a case for the jural deity and named this mosque. In testimony
we  get  a  kind  of  messianic  time  that  is  activated  through  pilgrimages  and  ritual
observances, but a time that almost always looks sideways at the absent mosque, while
the decisions of the three justices show how the demolition is worked upon and made
habitable  in law.  In  the process,  rather  than indicating the demands of  this  or  that
litigant, these decisions act like a speech prosthetic, by which inanimate objects (such as
the deity and the mosque) become voluble. While the deity is enmeshed within an eternal
present,  the  demolished  mosque  dislocates.  The  decisions  orient  themselves  to  this
doubling  by  pointing  to  a  vertiginous  simultaneity  of  time.  The  mosque haunts  this
eternal present. Gordon (1997) thinks of haunting as signifying a social figure, which is
then  mined  for  its  poetic  potential.  Rather  than  consider  the  mosque  as  a  unit  of
signification I  follow its career not simply for the poetic potential  that it  allows,  but
because its demolition and subsequent appearance as a ghostly figure puts into crisis the
future of the Rama temple itself.14
22 Before I present the testimonies I will outline how they are framed within the ‘gist of the
findings’ of the three judges.
23 Justice SU Khan: The ‘disputed structure’  was constructed as a mosque by and under
orders of the Mughal emperor Babur and no temple was demolished in its construction.
But the mosque was constructed over the ‘ruins of temples,’ which were lying in ‘utter
ruins’ for a very long time (2010 ADJ I: 115).
24 Justice SC Agarwal: It is declared that the area covered by the ‘central dome of the three-
domed structure, i.e., the disputed structure being the deity of Bhagwan Ram Janamsthan
and place of birth of Lord Rama as per faith and belief of Hindus, shall not be obstructed
or interfered in any manner by the defendants’ (2010 ADJ III: 2871).
25 Justice Dharamveer Sharma: The ‘disputed structure is the birthplace of Lord Rama. The
place of birth is a juristic person and a deity. The disputed building was constructed by
Babur,  the  year  is  not  certain,  but  it  was  built  against  the  tenets  of  Islam […].  The
disputed structure was built on the site of an old structure after demolition of the same.
Thus, the structure could not have the character of a mosque.’ (2010 ADJ III: 3453)
26 What is clear is that the ‘disputed structure’ or three-domed structure (never the Babri
mosque)  was  associated  with  ruins,  with  obstruction  and  interference  and  with
demolition. We will see later how these terms, in alliance with proper nouns, come to
circulate in the judicial account.
27 Testimony 1: Mahant Ram Vilas Das Vedanti, (in his affidavit of 2005 he says he is 51
years old. He was cross-examined by Tarunjeet Verma representing the Nirmohi Akhara,
and by Zafaryab Jilani representing the Sunni Waqf Board). Ram Vilas, at the time of his
deposition claimed to be the priest of a temple and had been living in Ayodhya since 1968.
He holds a doctorate in grammar from the Varanasi Sanskrit College.
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Prior  to  the  demolition  of  the  disputed  structure  at  the  Sriram  Janambhumi
premises,  the  main  gate for  entry  was  in  the  east,  which  was  called  the
Hanumatdwar […]. On entry to the disputed structure a platform towards the south
was called Ramchabutra,  where the idols  of  Lord Rama, Laxman, Sita,  etc.  were
present and were worshipped regularly by Hindu devotees. Below the Ramchabutra
was the ‘cave temple.’ [What follows is an elaborate architectural description of the
birthplace, ringed as it is, by a series of proper names of Hindu deities and places
mentioned in the Ayodhya Mahatmya of 1875].
28 Testimony 2:  Raja  Ram Pandey,  87  years  old  (affidavit  of  2003),  cross-examined  by
Zafaryab Jilani representing the Sunni Waqf Board.
29 Raja Ram Pandey was a resident of Kaushalya Ghat in Village Ramkot, the site of the
demolished mosque. He had been living in Ayodhya since 1930.
In March 1934 a Hindu-Muslim riot occurred when many Muslims were killed and a
large number of graveyards were damaged, but no part of the Sriram Janmabhumi
temple  or  its  dome  was  damaged.  The  outer  wall  was  damaged  slightly.  The
Muslims were terror-stricken and they stopped going towards the temple. I was 19–
20 at that time.
30 What follows in this testimony is the same elaborate description of the architecture of the
birthplace, of the deity and the form of worship.
31 Testimony 3: Narendra Bahadur Singh, 72 years (affidavit of 2004, cross-examined by the
same lawyer as in Testimony 2).
I gained maturity at the age of about 11 years […]. The structure collapsed on 6
December 1992 and thereafter my visits to the temple were reduced.
32 As with the other accounts, this one is rich in details on the geography of the birthplace,
the place of deities and the various pilgrimages that occur around the year.
33 If  Hindu  accounts  were  meticulous  in  their  evocation  of  the  birthplace,  Muslim
testimonies focused on the status of the mosque.
34 Testimony 4: Maulana Atiq Ahmad, 47 years (affidavit of May 2010. Cross-examined by
the advocates of the Nirmohi Akhara and by the Next Friends of the Deity).
Nowhere in Islam does the style of mosque construction find specific mention. The
name ‘masjid’ is given to a piece of land that is gifted for offering Namaz. Even if
this building has no domes or minarets, it will be called a masjid. Even if there is a
graveyard in the vicinity of the mosque, that does not change its character. You
killed our people, you destroyed our graves. But the mosque remains. A mosque
once constructed will always be a mosque […]. If the followers of other religions
start practicing their religious faith in a mosque, then also the status of the mosque
does not change.
Other Muslim testifiers echo much the same sentiments.
35 In which way does the decision of individual judges intersect with such testimony? In
considering  the  expectations  of  the  litigants,  the  High  Court  judges  actualize  legal
operations by consolidating existing norms, projecting their effects into the future and
attempting to produce expectations based on re-installed or altered norms.
36 Let me briefly indicate the direction of how I think the name is being used in the pair
Rama-Ayodhya.  In  the  judicial  decision,  the  name  delivers  the  expectations  of  the
litigants.  In  eliding  the  historical  facticity  of  the  mosque,  the  judicial  decision  also
conveys that what is there differs from what is or was present before 6 December 1992.
The names of Rama and Ayodhya are present in and of themselves. What becomes present
after the demolition contracts into what is accessible as worship, as deity and birthplace.
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But the mosque returns and splits this access into what was present before 1992 and what
is  really  there.  The  disputed  structure  complex,  in  its  alliance  with  the  destroyed
cemetery, becomes a metonym for Rama and Ayodhya, ensuring that this place-name will
forever  be  incomplete.  This  is  because  the  Babri  Mosque  haunts  the  deity  and  its
birthplace  in  appropriately  spectral  ways,  an  absence  that  sits  side-by-side  with  an
assumed presence, a stubborn response to the sacredness of Rama and Ayodhya.
37 For this reason, too, in Ayodhya Hindu worship is not without its doubts. With reference
to the ‘Rama temple’ there is a kind of precautionary formula used in prayer. When I
visited Ayodhya in 2008 I was advised to use expressions like, ‘whether you want to be
called Rama or Lakshmana, or Gopal, hear my voice,’ and ‘if this is the name by which you
would like to  be called.’  Underlying this  call  to  the name are the following sorts  of
questions. Do you need to know the name of the deity you’re praying to? If you get the
name of the deity wrong, what happens to your prayer and your oblations? Who gets to
decide whether the name works? (You, or the deity, or neither?) The name and birthplace
of the deity are, as I have tried to show, not only a declarative (by which you move from
the name to the city and vice-versa), whose invocation in law establishes an institutional
fact,  but  also a mode of  censorship by a specific  community of  Hindu devotees.  The
avowal of the name of the deity here must rest on a disavowal of the Babri Masjid. In
other  words,  these  questions  sense  the  frisson  of  a  spectral  presence  circulating
uncertainly in articles of law but without material presence. It is not inconceivable that
the Rama temple, if it is constructed on an officially controlled landscape, will not quite
shake the presence of ghosts from disturbed graves and a demolished mosque.
38 The Deity and the Janmasthan: The names, Rama and Ayodhya and the Babri mosque,
as  they  occur  in  the  2010  judgment,  have  a  variable  and  flexible  character.  This  is
understandable since they are linked to a cluster of other names, made up of single or
multiple rights and virtues. We have seen that these rights and virtues that make up
Rama and Ayodhya come in thick bundles and in large clusters.15 In the case of the Babri
mosque the cluster of other names within which it is located is hollowed out. Instead
there is something like an ontological vacancy built into this name. But before I develop
this argument further let me briefly delimit the relationship of Rama to Ayodhya. Put
more elaborately, how is the juristic personality of the deity framed within the backdrop
of the demolition of the Mosque, and how do we find a place for gods in the adjudication
around the dispute?16
39 An obvious dimension of the name Rama is its relationship to property as Ayodhya. If the
proper name denotes a person, in a common-sense way one assumes that person and
property (being a thing) are mutually exclusive. The 2010 judgment, we will see below,
qualifies this distinction, by showing that the legal rights and duties that make someone
count as person and something count as property are shifting and variable. The name
Rama bears the features of property, particularly janmabhumi and janmasthan, as much as
it is exalted as a virtuous god-king. This doubling—of property and virtue—is found in the
Allahabad High Court decision, but also in the lease deed executed between the Uttar
Pradesh state government and the Shri Ram Janmabhumi Trust in 1992. Earlier in 1989,
the Uttar Pradesh state government had acquired the land around the Babri Mosque and
the plan was to build a grand temple dedicated to Rama. The Trust was established in
1989 to oversee the construction of a grand temple.
40 The object of the Trust was to establish a religious theme park over state acquired land,
approximately 56 acres that surrounded the mosque and various Hindu temples.  The
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lease mentions that the object  of  the park was to,  ‘create experience of  the cultural
aspects emerging from the great epic Ramayana […]. The park should be integrated with
the overall development of that Ayodhya mentioned in the great Mahatmyas.’ A state
appointed surveyor mapped,  scheduled and delineated the red-boundary plot  of  land
over which the park would be built. It would be called the Ramkatha Park, reflecting
ostensibly  the  relation  between  the  Kingdom  of  Rama  and  the  present.  The  lease
announced the precise birthplace of Rama, known as the janmasthan, and Ayodhya the
janmabhumi. It would also function as the object of nationalist-religious pedagogy where
inhabitants of the complex, dressed in Vedic period costume, arranged guided tours for
school children. What was, thus, set in motion was a process of landscape interpretation,
with the mosque as  an ever-present  eyesore.  The lease  deed,  in  the process,  turned
topography into a set enmeshed in scriptural signs that had to be read instead of being
simply viewed. These signs imagined the park as a site of national regeneration and a
pastoral landscape, an edited panorama, where the mosque could exist only between the
visual registers of danger, Vedic authenticity and political invisibility.
41 In 1989 a suit  was filed by three plaintiffs:  Sri  Ramalala Virajman,  the Asthan Rama
Janmabhumi, Ayodhya (O.O.S. No. 5 of 1989) and a Vaishnava Hindu who argued that the
Rama deity, installed in the central dome of the mosque, and the place of birth were
juiristic persons. It also declared that the entire premises of Sri Rama Janmabhumi at
Ayodhya belonged to the plaintiff deities and asked for a perpetual injunction against the
defendants (the Sunni Waqf Board, the Nirmohi Akhara, Gopal Singh Visharad and 24
others), prohibiting them from interfering with or raising objections to the construction
of the new temple building at Sri Rama Janmabhumi, Ayodhya.
42 The Allahabad High Court attempted to resolve the above suit by arguing that both the
janmasthan and Rama Lala (Child Rama), surreptitiously installed in the central dome of
the Babri Mosque in 1949, were jural persons. In so doing the judges located the subject of
legal rights and duties on a threshold where judicial decision was marked by a continuous
emergence  from a  sacral  past  into  the  future.  This  opening  into  the  future  can  be
elaborated through three basic issues posed by the High Court. The first issue (Justice
Khan) considered whether the deity was a perpetual minor and if so, whether this minor
was subject to the Limitation Act of 1963. The second matter (Justice Agarwal) dealt with
the form of divinity and belief,  specifically swayambhu (self-revealed image) and pran
pratistha (infusion of breath into the deity). The third concern (Justice Sharma) was the
link between the deity and the image.
43 As  far  as  the  status  of  the  deity  as  a  perpetual  minor  was  concerned,  Justice  Khan
considered whether the minor was entitled to the benefit of the Limitation Act of 1963.
This Act raises the following question: if a person entitled to institute a suit or make an
application for the execution of a decree is reckoned a ‘minor, or insane or an idiot’ (ADJ
I: 80), can this person institute the same suit or execute an application, after the disability
has ceased? Analogically, the deity, in the position of a minor, was unable to make an
application itself  or  institute  a  suit,  since it  suffered from the same infirmities.  The
Justice,  however,  argued that the minor status of the deity was confined only to the
purpose of  filing a  suit—in all  other  instances  the deity  was  not  a  perpetual  minor.
Furthermore, as a minor it could never be freed from this disability. This meant that if
the deity were a perpetual minor, then the limitation would never come to an end. In his
order, Justice Khan declared ‘that the portion below the central dome where at present
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the idol is kept in a makeshift temple will be allotted to Hindus in final decree,’ thus
pointing to the jural status of the Rama deity (ADJ I: 80).
44 Just as Justice Khan recognized the legal status of the deity, Justice Agarwal argued that
both the deity and its place of birth were jural persons. Citing Ram Janki Deity Vs. State of
Bihar, (1999 (5) SCC: 50), the Justice held that the birthplace was self-revealed (swayambhu
), a product of infinite nature without beginning, and it was left to worshippers to simply
discover  its  existence.  Furthermore  the  swayambhu image  did  not  require  pratistha
(consecration of breath); the act of worship gave the place the essential features of a
temple. It was Justice Dharam Veer Sharma who provided the most elaborate explanation
of the jural deity and birthplace.
45 To establish that the Babri Mosque was built after razing a Hindu temple, Justice Sharma
decided  to  call  on  the  assistance  of  ‘archaeological  science’  (2010 ADJ  III: 2927).
Accordingly, the Archaeological Survey of India was directed by the Court in August 2002
to excavate the disputed site. The excavation, according to the Justice, revealed that the
Ram  Chabutra  (platform),  had  ‘five  different  structural  phases  in  its  construction’
(2010 ADJ III: 2954).17 In its enlarged form it was ‘22 metres in east-west and about 14
metres in north-south orientation’ (2010 ADJ III: 2954). The survey found evidence of a
massive  structure  that  could  be  dated  from the  tenth  century  onwards.  The  Justice
proceeded to quote from various sources to establish that  the structure was a Rama
temple. Verses from the Rig Veda were put alongside expert testimony, including those
drawn from the Ministry of Steel and Mines, epigraphy and histories of ancient India. In
effect, the Babri Mosque had usurped the place of the Rama temple (2010 ADJ III: 2970).
46 Having concluded that  the  massive  structure  razed in  the  construction of  the  Babri
Mosque was a Rama temple,  Justice Sharma went to great lengths to prove that this
structure  belonged  to  the  deity,  by  contending  that  the  latter  was  a  jural  person.
Furthermore, it was not only the deity that was a jural person, but the birthplace itself
was a jural entity. More than the deity, the janmasthan was swayambhu (self-revealed) and
did not require any form of consecration. The consequence of considering the janmasthan
and the Rama deity as jural persons meant that the two could not be alienated from each
other  though it  was  only  in  the  ‘ideal  sense  that  the  idol  is  the  owner  of  endowed
properties’ (2010 ADJ: 3409) and could have no beneficial interest in the endowment.18
The attempt nevertheless was to make a case for Hindu forms of worship and to link these
forms to Ayodhya incarnated as the name of Rama. The Justice was categorical in his
assertion  that  ‘the  religious  right  of  Hindus  to  worship  Ram Lala  at  the  janmasthan
became concretized before the Constitution came into being and the same requires to be
protected,’  and that no plea  could be  entertained to  prohibit  this  practise  (2010 ADJ
III: 3439).  Furthermore  Ayodhya  itself  was  marked  out  through  parikrama
(circumambulation). Circumambulation of the Rama deity was of three types—40 kose, 14
kose and 5 kose (1 kose is approximately two miles). In the process, the movement from
janmasthan (birthplace) to janmabhumi (land of birth) was secured.
47 What place did the Mosque have in this complex of names and territory? The final section
of this paper addresses the absent Mosque. Referring to one of the original suits filed by
the Sunni Central Waqf Board against various Hindu defendants and the state of Uttar
Pradesh, Justice Khan asked whether the demolished building was a mosque, its date of
construction, the exact plot of land on which it stood, its ownership till 1949, when its
owners  were  dispossessed,  and  finally  whether  the  Hindu  devotees  of  Rama  had
‘perfected right of prayers at the site by adverse possession’ (2010 ADJ I: 58).19 In effect,
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the issue that concerned this Justice was one that related to property ownership. In his
findings he observed that the ‘disputed structure’ was constructed as a mosque under
direct orders from the Mughal emperor Babur and that no temple was demolished in its
construction. Yet, he observed, before 1855 the Ram Chabutra and Sita’s kitchen had come
into existence inside the boundary wall of the mosque.20 This complex was called the
Chabutra Masjid. In view of the above, both Hindu and Muslim parties and the Nirmohi
Akhara were awarded joint possession of the entire premises (2010 ADJ I: 107–16). Thus,
as property, in Justice Khan’s estimation the Babri Mosque was linked to the disputed
structure and to the Chabutra Masjid. What was absented from his order was that the
mosque had also been a site of Islamic prayer. In his prelude he perhaps admitted to a
sense of loss—‘Here is a small piece of land (1500 square yards) where angels fear to tread.
It is full of innumerable land mines. We are required to clear it […]. We do not propose to
rush in like fools lest we are blown. However, we have to take a risk […]’ (2010 ADJ I: 27).
48 If Justice Khan was succinct in his order, his colleague Justice Sudhir Agarwal, more than
made  up  for  his  economy  of  words.  Extending  to  almost  3000  pages,  the  judgment
provides a detailed survey of various records, from beyond antiquity to the present, oral
testimonies, the deposition of witnesses, a reading of public reports and the discovery of
lost objects following archaeological excavations. Justice Khan’s ‘small piece of land,’ was
now fleshed out in greater detail. ‘The disputed structure is divisible into three parts. (1)
The main roofed structure, (2) the inner courtyard, and (3) outer courtyard […]. On the
outer  courtyard  there  is  a  Chabutra  which  has  been  in  possession  of  the  Hindus’
(2010 ADJ  I: 128).  The Babri  Mosque,  in this  rendition was associated with the ‘inner
courtyard.’ It was also called a ‘three-arched structure,’ with ‘three broad but pointed
arches on the façade. The liwan (sanctuary) that stood on a low plinth was composed of
three  square  bays,  roofed  by  three  single  broad  and  high  domes’  (2010 ADJ  I: 128).
Inscriptions  in  Persian and from the  Quran marked the  pillars  of  this  ‘three-arched
structure.’  And yet what was demolished was not a mosque,  for the inner and outer
courtyard belonged to the deity.
49 In answer to the claim of the Sunni Waqf Board that the inner courtyard was a mosque
under the care of the waqf Board, Justice Agarwal argued that ‘a deity is not damaged or
comes to  end  due  to  destruction  in  any  manner,  since  the  spirit  of  Supreme Being
continues to exist and it will not disappear, particularly when the deity is Swayambhu, i.e.
self-created’  (2010 ADJ  III: 2847).  The  janmabhumi similarly  was  swayambhu.  The
courtyard,  inner  and  outer,  therefore  had  a  dual  character,  being  both  deity  and
property. From here he argued that ‘It is quite possible that the entire city may be held to
be  very  pious  and  sacred  on  account  of  some  occurrence  of  divinity  or  religious
spirituality’ (2010 ADJ III: 2848). In answer to the claim that the disputed structure was a
mosque constructed in 1528 by Babur and that namaz had been offered continuously till
1949, he said that it could not be established that the mosque was built in 1528 and that
prayers had been offered in the mosque since that year. At best, the Friday prayer was
offered from 1860 till 16 December 1949 and that too intermittently (2010 ADJ III: 2855).
While this structure had a mutawalli (keeper of the mosque), he found the absence of a
muezzin surprising. The mutawalli had not been appointed following due procedure, the
possession  of  waqf  could  not  be claimed  by  him  and  by  extension  the  (Muslim)
worshipper could not claim possession of waqf property. Given that there was evidence of
namaz being offered at the site, the Justice held that part of the disputed structure was
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indeed a mosque, but that ‘there also existed a religious place of non-Islamic character
before the construction of the disputed structure’ (2010 ADJ III: 2860).
50 If the mosque was built on usurpation could it really be a mosque? Quoting from Quranic
verses Justice Dharam Veer Sharma argued that the waqif (person holding the waqf) must
be the owner of property, and there is nothing on record to suggest that the emperor
Babur, a Hanafi Muslim, had acquired the title of the temple. Accordingly, he could not
erect a mosque against the tenets of Islam (2010 ADJ III: 2971–75). For this reason, the
claim of the plaintiffs that the mosque was dedicated to Allah was decided against them.
And even if  the ‘building’  had been used by members of  the Muslim community for
offering prayers since the time of its construction, a non-Muslim now adversely possessed
it (2010 ADJ III: 2976). Effectively, the mosque had become a temple.
 
Conclusion
51 In the view of the three judges of the Allahabad High Court the Babri Mosque was read in
conjunction  with  ruins,  a  demolished  building  and  property  ownership.  Called  the
Chabutra Masjid, it was set against the original Ram Chabutra and Sita’s rasoi (kitchen).
Justice Agarwal divided the ‘Chabutra Masjid’ into an inner and outer courtyard. This
three-arched  structure  was  set  against  the  swayambhu deity  and  janmasthan.  Justice
Sharma was the most emphatic. In his view the Babri Mosque was built against the tenets
of Islam itself and it could never have been a place of legitimate prayer. Common to the
three accounts was the view that the Babri Masjid was a disputed structure.
52 The difference between the janmasthan and the mosque as it has developed in this paper
rests on the two being incommensurable. While the janmasthan is marked by a singularity
that encompasses the town of Ayodhya, the mosque loses all  specificity and becomes
instead  identified  with  prosaic  nouns—a  building,  three-domed,  three  arched.  When
sacrality is associated with it, the mosque is recognized by terms that evoke Hindu modes
of  worship.  And  yet,  in  the  High  Court  decisions  the  mosque  returns,  not  in  its
materiality,  not  even  as  a  catastrophe,  but  as  a  legally  induced  position.  More
appropriately, the mosque is a referent without a mental image and its evocation in the
High Court is set against Rama/Ayodhya, elaborated first in the Mahatmya and then taken
up by two of the three judges. Split off from its mental image, the mosque in the High
Court is externalized and set against the temple, which exists, perversely enough, only as
a mental image, never a reference. But because the mosque is set adrift of its status as a
mosque it enters into an endless circulation in law, allowing for multiple readings—as
waqf property, three-domed building, Chabutra masjid and so on. In this circulation the
mosque in its demolition bursts out of the past as materiality and into the present as an
article in law, indicating a disruption of linear time. It seems to get in the way of the
putative Rama temple and it is for this reason that the High Court tries so hard to brush it
aside.
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NOTES
1. For Ayodhya as an urban settlement connected to the Rama legend, see the magisterial work of
Bakker (1986) and Lutgendorf (1997: 19–54).
2. In colonial times the mosque was often referred to as the masjid-i-janmasthan (literally, mosque
of the birthplace).
3. In civil jurisdiction, four basic suits deal with the Ayodhya dispute in Independent India. A
Hindu  resident  of  Ayodhya,  who  claimed  his  right  to  worship  at  the  birthplace  without
hindrance, filed the first suit on January 16, 1950. The second suit (1959) was filed by the Nirmohi
Akhara (cloister),  claiming that it  was the sole religious order charged with maintaining and
managing the birthplace. The third suit (1961), filed by the Sunni Waqf Board, sought a decree
that the religious structure was a mosque to be handed over to the Board. The Next Friends of
the Deity on behalf of the child god Rama filed the fourth suit in 1989. It claimed that both the
deity and the birthplace were juristic persons. This suit forms the backbone of the Allahabad
High Court decision of 2010. I will discuss the judgment later in the paper.
4. The Government of India constituted the Liberhan Enquiry Commission on 16 December 1992
to enquire into the circumstances of the destruction of the mosque and to establish criminal
culpability. After several delays the report was tabled in the Indian parliament in 2009.
5. Aijaz Ahmad (2000), Sara Ahmad (1996: 320–50) and Sheetal Parikh (2005: 85–109) argue that
the destruction of the mosque posed a fundamental challenge to the secular republic. Parikh, for
example, says that ‘Ayodhya is not just a moment of India’s history; it is inextricably linked to
the nation’s present and future’ (p. 86). But this view of the secular does not consider that which
challenges it—religious belief and worship. Jan-Peter Hartung, et al. (2003) consider the religious
but evacuate it of its belief system. For the analysis of Ayodhya as cultural property see Ram
Sharma (2001: 127–38).
6. I  follow Ophir (2005: 44) to suggest that if law en-tongues the Babri Mosque, it does so by
becoming complicit in the game of hide and seek.
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7. The  NCC  (New  Catalogus  Catalogorum,  prepared  by  V.  Raghavan),  an  alphabetic  register  of
Sanskrit and allied works, mentions 36 recensions of the Ayodhya Mahatmya, derived in turn from
the Skandapurana, the Padmapurana or from no works at all. We also find Hindi translations, such
as those of Panini Pandey and Suryakaladevi Pandey, Sriramagopala Pandey or paraphrases, such
as those of Ram Narayan (1875). I will base myself on this latter text since it was the guidebook
used to map the city for the coronation of King Edward VII. For an authoritative description of
the 3 major recensions of the AM, see Bakker (1986, Vol. I, Vol. II).
8. As  I  understand  Kripke  (1972),  the  basic  idea  of  the  rigid  designator  is  one  where  the
expression in question has a fixed designation (given the context of its use) when considering
various counterfactual situations. Given this,  the name Rama will  not be able to designate in
worlds where Rama does not exist. Rather than use Rama (or Ayodhya, or the Babri mosque) as a
rigid designator, I assume that the meaning of a proper name is neither fixed nor determined,
but is supported by a series of links. In so doing it may seem that my argument is derived from
Searle’s (1958) article on proper names. Names, he says, do not function as descriptions, but as
‘hangars’ around which descriptions congeal. Further, if names have sense it is only because they
connect with objects to which they refer. For this reason, names can be substituted by definite
descriptions. The material that I am working with shows that names are also descriptions, but
descriptions  activated  by  other  names.  Other  names  (I  am thinking  here  of  the  name Babri
Masjid) are by the same process de-activated (I thank Jacob Copeman for this insight). It seems to
me more useful, therefore, to work with a family of names. This particular family, indicated by
the union of Rama to Ayodhya, is as is true of most families, also haunted by an outsider or
interloper—the Babri Masjid.
9. The  story  is  obviously  incomplete  and  may  be  filled  in  by  other  recensions.  This
incompleteness allows for additions, extrapolations and modifications, but it is not central to my
purpose in the paper. Suffice it to say that this AM is a discourse in the sense that Benveniste
(1971)  outlines  its  distinction from historical  narrative.  Discourse,  he  says,  designates  ‘every
utterance assuming a speaker and a hearer, and in the speaker, the intention of influencing the
other  in  some  way’  (Benveniste  1971:  209).  Furthermore,  distinct  from  narrative,  discourse
includes three basic tenses: the present, future and perfect tenses. The present is the basic tense
of the discourse because it marks the contemporaneousness of what is stated with the instance of
discourse.  It  is  thus  tied  to  the  self-referential  character  of  the  instance  of  discourse.  This
instance, we will see later is a spectral present.
10. The city is the residence of the dynasty to which Rama belongs, the Iksvaku.
11. Rinamochan, the text says, is at a distance of 200 yards from Brahmakund. Its water joins the
Saryu. A pilgrimage here is recommended for those in debt since it ‘wipes off debts.’ Likewise
Papamochan, 40 yards from Rinamochan, erases sins. Its pilgrimage is recommended on the 5th
day of the light half of Sravana (July-Aug).
12. The Hindu calendar is made up of 12 months. Where relevant I have provided correlations
with the Gregorian calendar. Each month of the Hindu calendar begins in the third week of the
Gregorian month. Each Hindu month is also divided into a light and dark half, corresponding
with the waxing and waning moon. The waxing phase is known as the Shukla, while the waning
phase is called Krishna.
13. I have 27 affidavits of testifiers. While there is a standard form of description, I find that,
unlike First Information Reports in the recording of a crime in the police station, these affidavits
are marked by cross-referentiality. They anticipate arguments; provide a way of addressing the
silences  of  other  accounts  and  most  often  supporting  the  testimonies  of  others.  This  cross-
referentiality  creates  the  impression  of  the flow  of  time,  making  possible  the  process  of
remembering and commemorating the past. But from affidavits presented by Muslim defendants
and plaintiffs, the mosque seems to be situated between the past and future horizon of Hindu
forms of worship.
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14. Here I am in agreement with Kilroy-Marac (2014: 255–76). In the story she tells of ghostliness
in a psychiatric clinic in Senegal, Kilroy-Marac moves between the actual and virtual to suggest
that foreign ghosts haunt according to a different set of rules from domestic ghosts (2014: 264).
Within  the  disputed complex  in  Ayodhya,  it  is  as  if  the  mosque is  made foreign and thus  a
different set of rules must apply to its presence as an interloper or usurper.
15. In earlier papers I have argued that such bundles make up the idea of property (Mehta 2015),
as much as they constitute the idea of the legal person (Mehta 2015, forthcoming).
16. An extensive literature discusses the deity as a jural person (Appadurai, 1981; Mukherjea,
1952; Sontheimer, 1964). I do not reference the intricate moves by which the jural deity changes
its contours—from domestic disputes during the 1870s onwards, to its status in temples. In the
story he tells of the Pathur Nataraja, Davis (2010: 195–206) shows how the Hindu god Siva became
the owner of his own property, namely the Nataraja icon. Smuggled out of India in 1976, this icon
reached the British museum for cleaning, where it was established that the Nataraja was a stolen
art object. In the ensuing court case, Siva acted as plaintiff with the Indian government serving
only as ‘technical plaintiff.’ Siva here was a juristic person and, as it turns out, a juristic agent,
who could own property and seek its lawful return when expropriated. The distinction between
person and property could not be sustained.
17. Situated  in  the  precincts  of  the  Mosque,  the  Ram Chabutra was  an  elevated  platform.  It
marked the exact spot of the janmasthan.
18. The rules of evidence marshaled to support the view that the Rama deity and his birthplace
were jural entities were again derived from eclectic sources—various translations of Valmiki’s
Ramayana,  the Skandapurana,  the 1875 Ayodhya Mahatmya,  Edward Thornton’s Gazetteer of  1858,
Carnegie’s report of 1870, the Imperial Gazetteer of 1905 and Neville’s Fyzabad Gazetteer of 1905, the
New Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. IX and so on.
19. On the night of 21–22 December 1949, the deities of Ram Lala and his brothers, Lakshmana,
Shatrughan and Bharata,  were  surreptitiously  installed  inside  the  central  dome of  the  Babri
Mosque. Following the installation, the mosque ceased to function as a site of Islamic prayers.
Instead  Hindus  were  allowed  darshan from  a  distance.  Effectively,  the  Babri  Mosque  lost  its
character as a place of worship from that date.
20. The  Ram  Chabutra,  apparently  marking  the  exact  spot  where  Rama  took  birth,  was  an
elevated platform located next to the actual mosque. It, too, was demolished in 1992.
ABSTRACTS
This paper studies the predicates associated with the name of the Hindu god Rama, as they come
to inhabit the temple town of Ayodhya. My intention is to show how the name Rama is linked to
the topography of Ayodhya, but also to a landscape that is marked by the absence of the Babri
Mosque, demolished by members of the Hindu right in 1992. The name Rama imagines Ayodhya
to be both a pastoral setting and a site of national regeneration. This is achieved by coupling the
architectural spaces of Ayodhya to the many names of Rama, and to his kingdom. I suggest that
the Rama deity, installed in the place of the mosque, acquires life in this combination.
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